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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, a Body Corporate I 
and Politic of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, Respondent, and 
Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
GRAND COUNTY, a Body Corporate I 
and Politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant, Appellant and 
Cross-Respondent 
No. 
9563 
Brief of Respondent and Cross Appellant 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Grand and San Juan Counties eacl) petitioned the Utah 
State Engineer to survey and monument Parallel 38° 30' North 
Latitude as the common county boundary to said counties, and 
the Utah State Engineer having had the said boundary located 
on the ground by enlarged Reconnaissance Survey, Grand 
County refused to accept the statutory boundary, refused to 
participate in the final marking of the boundary, announced 
Grand County would continue to exercise jurisdiction to a 
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township line 3500 feet south of the statutory boundary line 
until a court otherwise decreed. This action was brought by 
San Juan County to have the court determine the lawful 
boundary line between San Juan County and Grand County 
and direct Grand County to abide by that line as and when 
surveyed and monumented by the State Engineer. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Though the District Court by Findings of Fact determined 
the boundary to be Parallel 38° 30' North Latitude, as defined 
by statute, it refused to grant judgment to either plaintiff San 
Juan County on its complaint, or to defendant Grand County 
on its counterclaim, asserting the District Court had no juris-
diction in the matter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL 
San Juan County seeks to have this Court affirm the 
judgment of dismissal of the counterclaim of Grand County. 
On its cross-appeal, San Juan County asks for reversal of the 
judgment dismissing the complaint and the assessment of costs 
against San Juan County for the reason that the trial court 
erred in deciding it had no jurisdiction. In addition San 
Juan County asks this Honorable Court to enter judgment in 
accordance with Findings of Fact 1, 2 and 3 that the common 
boundary line between the two counties, and the line to be 
surveyed and monumented by the State Engineer of Utah, was 
and is Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude, and that such boundary 
line has never been changed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
San Juan County is unable to agree with the Statement 
of Facts contained in appellant's brief for the reason that 
Grand County omits a number of decisive facts and states as 
facts contentions of Grand County for which there is no proof. 
Defendant Grand County inaccurately infers that it has 
exclusively levied and collected taxes and exercised exclusive 
jurisdicton over all property and governmental services in what 
it refers to as the "disputed area." 
The "disputed area" varies in width but is approximately 
3 500 feet in width and extends from the Green River on the 
west to the Colorado line on the east, a distance of approxi-
mately 54 miles, and includes an area of 22,909.1 acres, or 
34 square miles. Properties to be taxed in the "disputed area" 
consist of fee lands and properties and easements of utilities 
such as Mountain States Telephone Company, Utah Power & 
Light Company, El Paso Natural Gas Company, Midland 
Telephone Company, motor carriers, such as Ashworth Trans-
fer, W. S. Hatch, bus companies and others (Tr. 98). 
There are also public roads through the "disputed area" 
which have been and continue to be maintained at the expense 
of San Juan County. 
Facts omitted from the Brief of Appellant Grand County, 
and facts which should be more accurately stated, are as fol-
lows: 
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TAXATION IN DISPUTED AREA 
The only lands taxed by Grand County in the disputed 
area are in two narrow strips of arable lands extending south 
from Moab. The acreage taxed varied from 160 acres in 1900 
to approximately 600 acres in 1960; which was owned by never 
more than seven different people (Ex. 163). The greatest 
acreage taxed was 1010 acres in 1941, which produced $179.18 
in taxes. Most of the lands in the disputed area are public 
domain. 
All utilities were assessed on their properties in the dis-
puted area and paid such tax to San Juan County. Significant 
amounts are represented in the taxes on these utilities. Though 
the figures are for the county as a whole, Utah Power & Light 
Company paid San Juan County in taxes for 1956, $5,666.03, 
J.ncluding the pro rata for property in the disputed area. In 
1959 this figure was $9,301.25. Likewise Pacific Northwest 
Pipeline in 1956, for all its property in San Juan County, in-
cluding that in the disputed area, paid taxes to San Juan 
County of $38,201.92, and in 1959, $41,177.54 (Tr. 300). 
The personal property of the Geyser Sawmill Lumber 
Company located in the disputed area had been taxed and 
taxes collected by San Juan County (Tr. 301). 
All personal properties of common carriers which traverse 
San Juan and Grand Counties are taxed and the taxes divided 
between. the two counties on the basis of mileage traveled in 
each, with the computation made on the basis of the common 
boundary being at a point 3500 feet north of the south line 
of Township 26 South, Range 23 East (Tr. 97-100; Ex. 83). 
San Juan County received all these taxes for the disputed area. 
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JURISDICTION OVER ROADS IN DISPUTED AREA 
The State of Utah by statute has created for the benefit~. 
of counties what is designated as the Class "B" road funds, 
which are allocated among the counties on the basis of the 
mileage of qualifying roads within the boundaries of the 
counties concerned. Exhibit 103 and the testimony of Dale 
Burninghahm of the State Road Commission (Tr. 238) estab-
lishes that the State of Utah, in allocating and paying the 
Class "B" road fund for San Juan County, included as mileage 
for computing San Juan County "B road funds" all qualifying 
roads within the disputed area. 
Exhibit 104 is one of several resolutions which periodically 
have been adopted by the defendant Grand County Board of 
County Commissioners, approving the allocation of Class "B" 
road funds on the basis of the county boundary line being at 
a point 3500 feet north of the south line of Township 26 
South, Range 22 East. 
As several of the roads in the disputed area dead-end at 
various view points and are reached from points in Grand 
County, Exhibits 114 and 115 represent the written agreement 
entered into between plaintiff and defendant counties, pursuant 
to which Grand County maintained the portion of the road 
in the disputed area for San Juan County and charged San Juan 
County for the cost of maintaining San Juan County roads in 
the disputed area. Exhibits 20, 112 and 116 show the payment 
of funds by San Juan County to Grand County in accordance 
with this agreement. 
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RECOGNITION BY PROPERTY OWNERS 
Exhibits 167 and 168 were received in evidence (Tr. 492) 
and represent 716 pages of documents affecting property in 
the disputed area that have been filed of record in San Juan 
County. The dates of these documents are generally from 1952 
to 1960, conforming with the uranium activity and more 
recently the potash leases and discoveries. These instruments 
are mining locations, states leases and federal leases, and are 
not assessed by the county but are to be assesse~ for taxes by 
the Utah State Tax Commission. A consideration of the 
hundreds of pages making up these two exhibits discloses 
the public recognition that lands in the disputed area are located 
in San Juan County, and those concerned with the protection 
of the title to their properties located in the disputed area 
place them of record in San Juan County. 
1912 SURVEY 
Defendant Grand County inaccurately and without any 
foundation whatsoever, contends that in 1912 the county 
boundary had been surveyed by mutual agreement and joint 
effort, placing the line coincident with the south line of Town-
ship 26 South. Defendant Grand County took the deposition 
of an 86-year-old former resident of San Juan County, who 
states that he was with a surveyor and line-man who were 
surveying the county line in 1912 (Tr. 459). The line surveyed 
did not follow the township line (Tr. 479). 
The witness stated that he had observed section corners 
from a 1906 survey and that the line being surveyed as the 
boundary line was north of the section corners (Tr. 480). 
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The witness stated that there were people from both Grand 
County and San Juan County who helped on the survey, but 
described those people at Page 482 of the transcript as people 
who volunteered to help "who were running cattle or sheep 
in that particular area. And as you would come near their 
location they would help." 
Though the defendant in its Statement of Facts asserts 
that the two counties by mutual agreement conducted a survey 
in 1912, there is no evidence whatsoever that Grand County 
ever participated in the survey; never paid anything; no minutes 
of Grand County were introduced showing that it was aware 
of the survey; no evidence was introduced that the county sur-
veyors or either county participated, or that the counties had 
county surveyors. The only evidence introduced by Grand 
County was that there was unilateral action by San Juan County 
in surveying the line. 
Defendant's Exhibit 132 is an excerpt from the minutes of 
San Juan of March 7, 1910, showing that the San Juan County 
Commission directed its surveyor to survey several roads "and 
to survey lines between Grand and San Juan Counties." No 
such direction was ever shown by Grand County Commissioners, 
no agreement is shown by any evidence, nor is there shown any 
expenditure authorized by Grand County in connection with 
this survey. 
Defendant claims that all of the "old maps" show Parallel 
38 o 30' North Latitude as coincident with the south line of 
Township 26 South. Exhibit 96-P of greater antiquity shows 
the parallel north of the township line. 
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SURVEY AND MONUMENTING BY STATE ENGINEER 
Neither the Utah State Engineer nor San Juan County 
has abandoned the proceeding to survey and monument the 
county boundary between San Juan and Grand Counties. Grand 
County, in writing and publicly, announced it would no longer 
participate in the monumenting and surveying of the boundary 
line. This, of course, interrupted the completion of the survey. 
The action before the Court was necessitated because the 
announced refusal of Grand County to honor the line so monu-
mented required that Grand County's assertion of jurisdiction 
beyond the statutory boundary line be quieted and determined. 
The line will be monumented as soon as the contentions 
of Grand County are determined. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFEND-
ANT GRAND COUNTY'S COUNTERCLAIM WHICH 
SOUGHT TO HAVE THE COURT FIX THE BOUNDARY 
AT A POINT DIFFERENT FROM THE STATUTORY 
DESCRIPTION. 
(A) GRAND COUNTY, BY ENGAGING THE STATE 
ENGINEER OF UTAH, PURSUANT TO TITLE 17-1-33 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, TO SURVEY AND 
MONUMENT PARALLEL 38° 30' NORTH LATITUDE 
AS A COMMON BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN 
GRAND AND SAN JUAN COUNTIES, WAIVED 
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ANY RIGHT OR CLAIM TO A BOUNDARY LINE 
AT ANY OTHER LOCATION. BY ITS PETITION 
AND RELATED ACTS GRAND COUNTY IS ESTOP-
PED FROM ASSERTING, AND/OR WAIVED ANY 
RIGHT, TO CLAIM A DIFFERENT BOUNDARY. 
The District Court properly determined that Title 17-1-33 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is the statutory and exclusive 
procedure for surveying and monumenting county boundaries 
where there is uncertainty or dispute as to their location. Grand 
County initiated and joined in engaging the State Engineer 
to take jurisdiction in surveying and monumenting the bound-
ary, as the following facts conclusively establish: 
Exhibit 49-P is a letter from Grand County to the State 
Engineer dated March 12, 1958, a copy of which was mailed to 
the county attorney of San Juan County: 
"A dispute has arisen as to the location of the bound-
ary line between Grand County and San Juan County. 
"The statute which defines the boundary line of the 
Counties described the line as being Parallel 38 o 30' 
North Latitude. Some of the older maps show the 
boundary line to coincide with the south line of Town-
ship 26 South; however, later maps indicate that the 
boundary should be approximately one-half mile north 
of the township line afore described. 
"Under the provisions of Section 17-1-33, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, the Grand County Commissioners 
request the services of the State Engineer to determine 
such boundary line.'' 
Exhibit 48 is a letter to the State Engineer by which San 
Juan County has submitted a similar request, and which was 
forwarded to the State Engineer March 10, 1958. 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Exhibit 50 is a letter of Wayne P. Criddle, State Engineer, 
dated March 19, 1958, directed to the County Attorneys of 
both counties, acknowledging receipt of the request for the 
establishment of the boundary line, and suggesting a meeting 
at Moab. 
At Pages 310-311 of the record, Mr. William C. Walton, 
County Commissioner of San Juan County, states the meeting 
was then held at Moab with the State Engineer and representa-
tives of the respective counties, all of whom are named, and 
that the following occurred (Tr. 313): 
"Yes, I suggested that it (the common county bound-
ary) be referred to the State Engineer and we would 
accept whatever designation the State Engineer put on 
it and asked Mr. Bolden of Grand County if he would 
do the same, and he said yes." 
At Page 314 of the record Mr. Walton st ated: 
"Q. Now, can you tell us whether the statement you 
have given us, leaving it to the State Engineer, 
was made before or after the reconnaissance? 
A. It was made before the reconnaissance." 
Then followed correspondence hereinafter set forth: 
Exhibit 53 is a letter of April 11, 1958, to the County 
Attorneys of each county from the State Engineer, advising 
that pursuant to his best information the boundary line is 
"3500 feet north of the south line of Township 26 South." 
Exhibit 54 is a letter from the State Engineer to the County 
Attorneys, dated April 15, 1958, indicating that the boundary 
line could be best established by simply "measuring the hori-
10 
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zontal distance from the section corners north to where the 
parallel should be ... Incidentally, if we had to call up the 
Coast and Geodetic Survey on this problem, it is possible that 
the cost might exceed $50,000." 
Exhibit 55 is a letter from the San Juan County Attorney 
to the State Engineer, expressing that his county would be 
willing to have the point fixed at 3500 feet north of the south 
line of Township 26 South, and requesting one of the State 
Engineers to monument such a boundary. 
Exhibit 56 is a letter from the County Attorney of Grand 
County to the State Engineer to the effect that his county was 
not in a position at that time to accept as a fact the assumpion 
that Parallel 38 o 30' is on a line 3 500 feet north of the south 
line of Township 26 South. 
Exhibit 57 is a letter dated April 23, 1958, from San Juan 
County to the State Engineer, requesting that the State Engineer 
proceed to employ the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey to survey 
the line. 
Exhibit 58 is a letter of Wayne D. Criddle, State Engineer 
of Utah, dated April 25, 1958, to the Director of the U. S. 
Coast and Geodetic Survey, requesting their assistance in 
running the boundary line, copies of which were sent to each 
county. 
Exhibit 59 is a letter from the U. S. Coast and Geodetic 
Survey to the State Engineer, indicating that a reconnaissance 
survey could be provided for an estimated cost of $1200.00. 
Exhibit 60 is a letter dated May 2, 1958, from the State 
Engineer to the County Attorney of Grand County, enclosing 
11 
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copies of Exhibit 59 and requesting that funds of $600.00 be 
forwarded for the survey. 
Exhibit 61 is a letter dated May 2, 1958, with copies to 
both County Attorneys from the State Engineer of Utah, which 
reads as follows: 
"Gentlemen: 
Enclosed is a copy of a letter just received f£om the 
Coast and Geodetic Survey which I believe is self-
explanatory. 
"Because of the economic importance to your coun-
ties of the positioning of latitude 38 o 30' with respect 
to the township line, we feel that only the most authen-
tic survey possible should be considered. This assumes 
that both counties will not agree to the positioning as 
shown on the new quadrangle sheets of the U.S. Geo-
logical Survey. 
"We recognize that, at this time, you may not wish 
to bear the cost of marking the entire boundary with 
monuments two miles apart, however, such complete 
marking might be done at one time most economically 
while the surveyors are on the ground. Perhaps monu-
ments established at the Colorado line and at the west 
end of the joint county line, plus several monuments 
in Ranges 20 and 21 East, may serve your immediate 
purposes. However, to fix the costs will apparently 
require a visit of U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey per-
sonnel to the area. 
"We are sure that you desire this problem cleaned 
up as soon as possible. Do you wish us to officially 
request the Coast and Geodetic Survey to make the 
reconnaissance and will each county agree to under-
write the $600 cost of this preliminary investigation? 
Sincerely yours, 
Wayne D. Criddle" 
12 
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Exhibit 62 is a letter dated May 5, 1958, to the State Engi-
neer of Utah from San Juan County, agreeing that it will 
"underwrite one-half of the cost of such investigation, or any 
other expenses involved in having this matter settled." Exhibit 
63 is a letter of May 6, 1958, from Grand County to the State 
Engineer of Utah, which reads as follows: 
"Dear Mr. Criddle: 
Re: Boundary dispute between Grand 
and San Juan Counties. 
"Reference is made to your letter dated May 2, 1958, 
regarding the above entitled matter. 
"Grand County agrees to and will underwrite the 
approximate cost of $600.00 for its share of the pre-
liminary investigation to establish the boundary line. 
"The County is not in any position to create any ex-
tensive obligation regarding the matter and it is hoped 
that the line can be established somewhere in relation 
to the South boundary line of Township 26S as there 
appears to be no question as to where the South line of 
Township 26S is located. 
"It is our thinking that once the actual location of 
latitude 38 o 30' is established on the earth's surface 
at some point in the Colorado River area there will 
be no need to set markers along the boundary line, 
except in three or four predetermined places." 
Exhibit 69 is a letter dated June 4, 1958, to the State Engi-
neer of Utah from Grand County, enclosing $600.00 "as Grand 
County's share of the estimated cost of a reconnaissance of 
the boundaries between Grand and San Juan Counties." 
Exhibit 72 is a check of Grand County showing the pay-
ment of an additional $741.86 on March 2, 1959, for "recon-
13 
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na1ssance (only) for survey to locate the boundary between 
Grand and San Juan Counties." 
At Pages 200 and 201 of the record the Deputy State 
Engineer testified "that the purpose of this survey, as far as 
we were concerned, was to determine engineering-wise the posi-
tion of 38 o 30' as close as he could determine within the funds 
available and within time limitations. And we further indicated 
that in order that his survey-there should be something that 
would be something we could tie to later on-that he should 
mark 38 ° 30' as near as he could determine it from his survey 
positions along the 38 o 30' parallel on the ground." 
Stations were then set up at intervals along 38 o 30' by the 
survey crew, which Mr. Lambert, the Deputy State Engineer, 
identified (Tr. 201) as "a stake supported by guy wire and in 
some instances it was still :flagged and in some instances the 
:flag blown off and this stake was anchored into the surface of 
the ground at a semi-permanent position." 
Exhibits 76 and 77 are plats prepared by the U. S. Coast 
and Geodetic Survey, indicating the work they have done, and 
illustrating thereon by a designated line on the plats the position 
38 o 30' North Latitude, with the various stations marking on 
the ground the position of that latitude from Green River to 
the Colorado boundary, and indicating the relation of such 
boundary line to established monuments, such as the South 
Quarter Corner of Sec. 32, T. 26 S., R. 20 East (Exhibit 79), 
and designated "Coast and Geodetic Survey Stations." 
The foregoing facts conclusively establish that Grand 
County engaged the State Engineer of Utah to "permanently 
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determine such boundary line." Such facts conclusively e~tab­
lish that in connection with such proceeding Grand County 
agreed to accept the determination made by the State Engineer 
and that it was not until the "reconnaissance survey" revealed 
that the boundary was approximately two-thirds of a mile 
north of the South boundary of most of the Townships 26 
South that Grand County refused to accept the determination 
made by the State Engineer. The claim that there had been a 
"survey in 1912" was made for the first time near the con-
clusion of the trial. 
As a matter of law, Grand County is bound by the State 
Engineer's determination of the boundary, and has waived its 
rights, if any, and is estopped to claim otherwise for two 
reasons: 
FIRST: Estoppel from taking an inconsistent position. 
Section 17-1-33 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is the exclu-
sive method provided by the Legislature for surveying and 
monumenting an uncertain or disputed boundary on the ground. 
A county requesting the State Engineer to act under this statute 
admits: 
( 1) That there is a dispute or uncertainty as to a 
boundary. 
( 2) That the county surveyors have failed to agree 
or have failed to establish a boundary. 
( 3) That the State Engineer can survey and monu-
ment only the boundary established by law. The law 
which establishes county boundaries for these two 
counties is the Utah Statute 17-1-22 U.C.A. 1953, for 
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San Juan County, and 17-1-13 U.C.A. 1953 for Grand 
County. 
( 4) That the line so monumented shall be the line 
until modified by the Legislature. 
Courts will not permit the initiating of statutory remedies 
and permit the initiating party to take a contrary position. 
Having admitted the lawful statutory boundary by the 
petition to the State Engineer, Grand County is estopped from 
asserting a boundary at another location. 
Having admitted that the county surveyors had failed to 
agree or otherwise failed to establish the boundary, in order to 
get the State Engineer to act, Grand County will not be per-
mitted to assert that the county surveyors had fixed the boundary 
or that the counties had agreed on the boundary. 
In Hinsdale County vs. Mineral County, 48 Pac. 675, the 
issued involved was the location of a common boundary line 
between two counties. The Colorado statute provided in a 
manner quite similar to Utah's that when a dispute arose, and 
upon application of the counties involved, "it shall be the duty 
of such State Engineer . . . to run out and establish such line 
. . . and to fix and define such boundary line by plain and 
substantial mounds and markers." The determination of the 
Colorado State Engineer is made final unless an appeal is taken 
to the District Court. 
The parent counties concerned had petitioned the State 
Engineer to survey an uncertain and indefinite boundary line, 
and, pursuant to notice, the State Engineer had made the survey 
and made a report to each of the counties of his work, accom-
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panied by plats on which the boundaries were shown. One 
of the counties contended that it was not bound by the deter-
mination of the County State Engineer because for sometime 
before the attempted boundary adjustment its parent county 
had exercised dominion over the territory in dispute and had 
claimed and successfully asserted the right to collect taxes 
in that territory. The Court then states at Page 680: 
"When it (Saguache County) petitioned the State 
Engineer for the adjustment of its disputed boundary, 
it confessed that it was uncertain where the boundary 
was, and whether the territory in dispute belonged 
to it or not. It placed itself on an exact level with the 
opposing claimant of the territory; that its claim of 
boundary was not acquiesced in by Hinsdale County 
is evidenced by the fact that the latter county also 
petitioned for an adjustment of the same boundary. 
There were opposing claims to the territory, and if 
it could possibly be said that the acts of dominion exer-
cised by Saguache County over this territory invested 
that county with any right, legal or equitable, it waived 
those rights by invoking the action of which counsel 
complain." 
The Supreme Court of the United States has announced 
a similar doctrine of law that a party will not be permitted to 
occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position with regard 
to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, 
one previously assumed by him. 
In Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673, 24 L. Ed. 168, an action 
was brought against the stockholders of a bank to pay the 
liabilities of the bank as provided by statute. The stockholders 
raised as one of the defenses that the corporation of which 
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they were shareholders had no legal existence. The court 
rejected this defense by saying: 
''Parties must take the consequences of the position 
they· assume. They are estopped to deny the reality of 
the state of things which they have made appear to exist, 
and upon which others have been led to rely. Sound 
ethics require that the apparent, in its effects and con-
sequences, should be as if it were real, and the law 
properly so regards it." (Citing authorities). 
The same doctrine of law has been applied by state courts. 
In State ex rei Fitch vs. St ate Board of School Commissioners 
of Wyoming, 27 Wyo. 54, 191 Pac. 1073, it was contended 
that the bid was not proper at the public sale and therefore 
the alleged sale was not valid. The court, in holding that the 
sale was valid, stated: 
"It further appears by the respondent's own evidence 
that not only in this instance, but also in such sales 
throughout the state generally, the state officers have 
regarded and acted upon the guaranty of the applicant 
as a bid. Having placed that construction upon the 
language contained in the guaranty, they should not 
be heard to here insist upon a different construction 
of it." 
SECOND: Grand County having represented to the State 
Engineer and San .fuan County that the boundary to be surveyed 
is Parallel 38° 30' North Latitude, and in reliance thereon 
the State Engineer and San Juan County having entered into 
an agreement pursuant to which that line was surveyed and 
marked and moneys expended in reliance thereon, Grand County 
is estopped to assert that the line to be surveyed is other than 
38° 30' North Latitude. 
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Grand County induced San Juan County to enter into an 
agreement and expend $1341.66 on surveying Parallel 38 ° 30' 
North Latitude as the boundary. Grand County will not now 
be allowed to contend the line to be surveyed or the boundary 
to be located is a point other than 38 ° 30' North Latitude. 
Grand County petitioned the State Engineer of Utah to 
survey and monument Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude as the 
boundary pursuant to Section 17-1-33 U.C.A., 1953 (Ex. 49). 
Grand County duly notified San Juan County of submission of 
the matter to the State Engineer. 
A meeting was held at Moab, with Commissioners of 
both counties attending with the Utah State Engineer, and 
both counties agreed to abide by Parallel 38 ° 30' North Latitude 
as established by the State Engineer (Tr. 313). 
Proposals of the State Engineer to accept the boundary 
as 3500 feet north of south section corners of Township 26 
South (Ex. 53), or by measuring 3500 feet north of such 
section corners (Ex. 53), were rejected by Grand County, as 
a result of which was the agreement (Ex. 63) by which each 
county agreed to have the State Engineer secure the services 
of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey to survey and 
stake Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude as the boundary. 
Each county was sent a copy of the plat evidencing the 
enlarged reconnaissance survey, and showing the locations of 
the boundary markers, and the position of 38 o 30' North Lati-
tude in relation to the various U. S. Coast and Geodetic tri-
angulation stations, and also in relation to the location of 
several section corners of the south line of Townships 26 South. 
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Such plat confirmed what the State Engineer had previously 
told the two counties that the county boundary is approximately 
3500 feet north of the south lines of Townships 26 South. 
The two counties agreed on the fact that the boundary 
to be surveyed and marked was 38 o 30' North Latitude. This 
fact having been established by the agreement, neither party 
may thereafter repudiate that fact and contend for a different 
boundary from the true line after San Juan County proceeded 
in good faith in reliance on the submission by Grand County 
to the State Engineer and expended moneys toward the ascer-
tainment of the true boundary line. 
At 31 C.J.S., Par. 55, at Page 232, the rule is announced: 
"In the absence of fraud, acident or mistake, parties 
to a contract and their privies are estopped to deny 
facts agreed on or assumed in the making of the con-
tract." 
This Court in Migliaccio vs. Davis, 120 Utah 1, 232 
Pac. (2) 195, was considering a case in which the appellant 
having an interest in a mining property stood silent while 
representations derogatory to his interests were made, and 
in reliance on which moneys and effort were expended by 
respondent, all of which were known to appellant. In applying 
an equitable estoppel against the appellant asserting his full 
interest in the property against respondent, the Court states 
at Page 199: 
"Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is the principle 
by which a party knows or should know the truth is 
absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from 
denying or asserting the contrary of any material fact 
which by his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, 
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intentionally or through culpable negligence, he has 
induced another, who was excusably ignorant of the 
facts and who had a right to rely upon such words 
and conduct, to believe and act upon them thereby, 
as a consequence reasonably to be anticipated, changing 
his position in such a way that he would suffer injury 
if such denial or contrary assertion were allowed." 
The position of Grand County in initiating and agreeing 
to this survey and securing the agreement of San Juan County 
was that the boundary to be surveyed was Parallel 38 o 30' 
North Latitude. Certainly Grand County will not now be 
permitted to claim the boundary is at a different parallel. 
Grand County, having petitioned the State Engineer con-
cerning an uncertain boundary, will not be allowed to assert 
that the boundary line was previously fixed and established 
in a location different from the line defined by the statute. 
Other agreements and practices which estop Grand County 
from asserting a contrary position to Parallel 38 ° 30' North 
Latitude as the boundary, are the following: 
For twenty years Grand County had approved the distri-
bution of "B" and "C" road funds on the basis of the boundary 
with San Juan County being at Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude. 
Maps of Grand County showing roads qualifying, mileage 
computation and county boundaries were prepared by the State 
Road Commission annually and formally approved by Grand 
County Commissioners. Such maps showed the boundary with 
San Juan at Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude and as a point 
two-thirds of a mile north of the south township line of Town-
ship 26 South. (See Ex. 46-47 and 104). This has been true 
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since 1940 (Tr. 281-296), with such maps the basis for the 
distribution of the funds. 
From 1952 through 1960, Grand County by written agree-
ments. has charged San Juan County for maintaining all roads 
in the disputed area on the basis of the county boundary being 
two-thirds of a mile north of the township line. These charges 
have exceeded $2500.00 a year for the years since 1956. (Ex. 
112-116-117). 
(B) THE PURPORTED SURVEY OF 1912 DID NOT 
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 17-1-33 
U.C.A. 1953, TO ESTABLISH A DISPUTED COUNTY 
BOUNDARY. 
Under its Point No. 1 Grand County claims it is entitled 
to a judgment establishing the line "surveyed, marked and 
monumented by the mutual consent and agreement of the two 
parties to be the true common boundary line between the two 
counties." The burden of defendant's argument under this 
point is that the 1912 survey testified to by C. R. Christensen 
constitutes a survey meeting the requirements of Section 17-1-33 
U.C.A., 1953. 
This statute does provide the exclusive method by which 
uncertain and disputed boundaries are to be established on 
the ground. Its requirements are: 
(a) The line "may be determined by the county surveyors 
of t,he counties interested, or if they fail to agree"; 
(b) By the State Engineer on application of either or both 
county commissions "by making the necessary survey 
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and erecting suitable monuments to designate the 
boundary.'' 
(c) Neither the State Engineer nor County Surveyor shall 
have any authority other than "to erect suitable monu-
ments to designate boundaries as they are now estab-
lished by law." 
Defendant Grand County, at Page 10 of its brief, states 
that its evidence on this point rests entirely on the description 
of a survey m 1912 observed by C. R. Christensen, plus San 
Juan County minutes (Exhibits 129-139). Its case fails for the 
following reasons: 
1. There is no evidence that either San Juan County or 
Grand County had a surveyor in 1912. 
A review of Exhibits 129 to 139 indicates that in 1910 
San Juan County had employed a surveyor Woodman to do 
work on roads and boundary lines in 1910. None of Exhibits 
129 to 139 concern the purported work done in 1912, and do 
not identify any person as a County Surveyor. 
None of the testimony admitted in evidence identifies 
any person as a County Surveyor of either San Juan County 
or Grand County. 
2. If there was a County Surveyor, there is no evidence that 
the San Juan County Surveyor or Grand County Surveyor 
participated. 
Neither the Exhibits 129 to 139, nor the testimony of 
Christensen admitted in evidence, identify any person as the 
County Surveyor of either Grand County or San Juan County. 
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Mr. Christiansen was not the county surveyor nor even a sur-
veyor. He might have been county assessor or sheriff. The 
statute, however, never did authorize any county officers other 
than the county surveyors of the two counties to determine 
the county boundary. Consequently, there was an utter lack of 
compliance with the statute. 
3. There is no showing that Grand County authorized or 
participated in the 1912 survey in any manner whatso-
ever. 
No minutes or testimony were introduced to show that 
Grand County or San Juan County, or any officials of either 
San Juan County or Grand County, were authorized to act or 
were acting for their counties. Neither is there any evidence 
of any agreement or that either County authorized anyone to 
participate in the 1912 survey. 
4. The line surveyed was testified by Christensen to have 
been run on a course north of any section line. 
At T r. 480 Christensen is asked: 
"Q. But this particular line that you were attempting 
to survey, was it north of the section corner? 
A. Well, that is what the boys said. As I said, there 
was different survey marks there and the marks 
on them indicated that they had been done in 
1906. I remember that quite well, but I don't 
know who did it. 
Q. And the line you were running was north of that 
line? 
A. Yes, sir." 
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5. The Finding of the District Court that the 1912 Line was 
not established and cannot be found is supported by the 
evidence. 
Christensen (Tr. 479) stated, "the line did not follow the 
township line." 
Richard 0. Cozzens, a surveyor employed by defendant, 
testified that either during or immediately prior to the trial 
he had followed a mound of stones which indicated a boundary 
line. Each and every monument Cozzens testified to was identi-
fied with a United States Land Survey. Each mound of stone 
Cozzens identified was a section corner or a quarter corner 
of a United States Land Survey on the south line of two town-
ships (Tr. 430, 433-434). The mounds of stone he found are 
described in the field notes of an official Land Office survey in 
1902, being a survey of portions of Township 26 South, Range 
23 East (Ex. 125). The other mounds are described in the 
field notes of a partial survey of 1894 of the south line of 
Township 26 South, Range 23 East (Ex. 120). There is no 
testimony that any of these monuments were those erected in 
1912. 
Defendant called an old-time resident Holyoak as a witness 
to certain monuments, and he identified the monuments as 
those he had seen in 1907. Exhibits 120-D and 125-D are 
field notes of Land Office surveys which show that rock monu-
ments were erected on the south line of the two townships in 
question in 1894 and 1902. As Mr. Holyoak saw the monu-
ments five years before 1912, they could only be monuments 
established by government surveyors some ten to eighteen years 
prior to the 1912 monuments. 
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Neither testimony nor minutes indicated that a plat or 
field notes were prepared in connection with any survey in 
1912. There is, therefore, no evidence in this record, nor any 
evidence indicated, which could possibly identify any point 
established or monumented in 1912. It would be futile to 
attempt to locate any course run in 1912. 
The finding of the District Court with reference to the 
1912 survey that 'fhe extact location thereof cannot be deter-
mined" is certainly true, and no contrary determination could 
be made on any evidence introduced in this case. 
(C) THE DOCTRINE OF ACQUIESCENCE IS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO ESTABLISH A COUNTY 
BOUNDARY IN UTAH AT OTHER THAN THE 
LOCATION PROVIDED BY STATUTE. 
1. PARALLEL 38° 30' NORTH LATITUDE IS A 
DEFINITE AND ASCERTAINABLE STATU-
TORY COUNTY BOUNDARY LINE AND CAN 
NOT BE LEGALLY CHANGED BY ACQUIES-
CENCE. 
20 C.J.S., Sec. 22, Pages 773-774 states: 
"Acquiescence can be considered only when there 
is uncertainty because of a conflict in the calls, monu-
ments or descriptions employed in the statute fixing 
the line; ... A county's boundary line, however, as 
fixed by statute, if determinable, cannot be changed 
by laches or acquiescence, and acquiescence in another 
line is immaterial where the true boundary line can 
be determined as a question of law." 
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El Elmore County vs. Tallaloosa County, 131 So. 552, the 
Court states: 
"If a boundary line of a county can be ascertained 
as a question of law, acquiescence in another line by 
contiguous counties is immaterial." 
In view of the provisions of Article XI, Section 1, Con-
stitution of Utah, this Court in Summit County vs. Rich County, 
57 Utah 553, 195 Pac. 639, held that not even the state legis-
lature can alter a county boundary line which is definite, 
stating: 
"The fact that other parts of the boundary line be-
tween the two counties may be ambiguous or un-
ascertainable by engineering skill, did not justify the 
legislature in ignoring altogether that which was clear 
and unmistakable." 
In a subsequent determination between Summit and Rich 
Counties ( 63 Utah, 193, 224 Pac. 653) this Court again states 
that the legislature cannot create a new line "unless the descrip-
tion of the boundary line is so indefinite, uncertain or ambigu-
ous that the line cannot be definitely determined from the de-
scription of it." 
Parallel 38 ° 30' North Latitude is, and at all times since 
it was first created as a county boundary line by the territorial 
legislature, has been a definite and ascertainable line. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in Yuma County vs. Maricopa 
County, 19 Ariz. 475, 172 Pac. 276, states: 
"The boundary line being the meridian line its 
description was not indefinite . . . The fact that a 
certain meridian of longitude was designated as the 
boundary did not render the descriptive line uncertain 
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or make the statute ambiguous so as to require. con-
struction through the aid of extrinsic circumstances. 
Although a line so described may be difficult of prac-
tical location, nevertheless when employed to define 
a boundary line it constitutes the true line to be fol-
lowed in making a practical location." 
2. GRAND COUNTY OFFICERS BY THEIR ACTIONS 
COULD NOT EXTEND THE TERRITORY OF 
THAT COUNTY; NEITHER COULD SAN JUAN 
COUNTY OFFICERS BY INACTION CONTRACT 
THE TERRITORY OF SAN JUAN COUNTY. 
As expressed by the Colorado Court in Board of Commis-
sioners of Ouray County vs. Board of Commissioners of San 
Juan County} 143 Pac. 841, at Page 842: 
''A county line is not determined by the actions of 
omission or commission of public officers." 
In Hinsdale County vs. Mineral County} 48 Pac. 675, the 
Court states: 
"Saguache County is not a county by prescription. 
It was created by statute. Outside of statute it has no 
existence and all of its territorial rights are derived from 
statute. It has and can have no territory except what 
the statute gives it." 
3. ASSUMING ONLY FOR PURPOSES OF ARGU-
MENT THAT THE DOCTRINE OF ACQUIS-
CENCE MAY APPLY AS TO A COUNTY 
BOUNDARY, NEVERTHELESS GRAND COUN-
TY FAILED IN ITS PROOF TO ESTABLISH A 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
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In Nelson v. DeRouch, 87 Utah 457, 50 P. (2d) 273, at 
Page 277, this Honorable Court not only held that a party 
who asserts acquiescence in a line differing from the true line 
has the burden of proof, but that the proof must show that 
the line varying from the true line, 
( 1) Has been open to observation and marked by monu-
ments, fences, or buildings; 
( 2) Knowingly acquiesced in as the recognized true line 
for a long period of time; and 
( 3) The parties must have occupied up to that line. 
The counties, of course, do not "occupy" the lands within 
their boundaries. In the Nelson case the court refused to 
apply the doctrine of acquiescence for there was no proof that 
the. fences were located by agreement of the parties, and the 
only time the boundary location was discussed "it was agreed 
to have a survey made and abide by the true boundary so 
established.'' 
The line contended for by Grand County as having been 
established by "acquiescence" as the county boundary consists 
of the south lines of "Township 26 South ... as said township 
line is now marked and as it extends between the eastern 
boundary of the State of Utah and the middle of the main 
channel of the Green River ... " Neither county had anything 
to do with the surveys of the south lines of said townships, 
10 in number. There is an offset of 623 feet to the north from 
the southeast corner of Township 26 South, Range 24 East, 
to the southwest corner of Township 26 South, Range 25 East. 
The south lines of those townships were all surveyed by the 
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United States as part of the public lands. The south lines of 
Townships 26 South, Ranges 17¥2, 18 and 19 East were not 
surveyed until 1954. Thos~ township lines did not exist until 
1954 and "acquiescence" could not apply to a non-existent line. 
The line at Range 24 East was not surveyed until 1946. 
The only evidence of monuments on the south lines of 
those townships consists of (a) United States survey monu-
ments erected as section corners, quarter corners and witness 
corners; (b) three segments of fence on or near the township 
line in the area of the airport, Section 36, T. 26 S., R. 22 E.; 
and (c) two highway signs to the south of the township lines. 
Each of the section corners, quarter corners and witness 
corners was erected by the United States, the first ones in 
October, 1880, and the last monuments in 1954. Not one of 
those monuments was ever erected to mark any county bound-
ary. There is no evidence that either county erected the road 
signs, nor that either county constructed any one of the three 
sections of fence. Consequently, neither county had anything 
to do with establishment or maintenance of any of those 
"monuments." Not a single one of those "monuments" was 
located in its position to establish a county line nor to settle 
a boundary dispute. At Ranges 17¥2, 18 and 19 East, the 
monuments did not exist prior to 1954, and therefore existed 
only for a very short period of time prior to suit. 
In the Nelson case this Court said that "the fact of locating 
a building or a fence or other structure that may later take on 
the nature of a monument, in the absence of, or without the 
knowledge of, the adjoining owners, or upon a supposition 
that said location is the true boundary line when in fact it is 
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not, and when no agreement or long acquiescence is shown, 
does not establish a boundary line different from the true one." 
Furthermore, in Oklahoma v. Texas, 272 U.S. 21, 71 L. E. 
145, ____ S. Ct. ____ , it was declared that in order for a line to 
be acquiesced in and adopted as the boundary it would have 
to be established on the ground and marked. The Court further 
remarked that the conduct of both states in requiring settle-
ment of the boundary negatived acquiescence. 
The following matters of record conclusively show that 
there was no acquiescence in the south lines of Township 26 
South by either Grand County or San Juan County: 
By letter dated September 5, 1925, Exhibit 78, the State 
Engineer recommended that the Legislature change the bound-
ary line to the south lines of Township 26 South as far as 
then surveyed and platted. However, by resolution dated 
October 5, 1925, Exhibit 164, Grand County Commissioners 
declared that "Grand County does not feel that it should 
agree on the township line as representing the county boundary 
if, in fact, it does not do so"; and that the portion of the line 
in the vicinity of the Colorado River should "be accurately 
established." Said resolution negatives "acquiescence". 
For the past twenty years Grand County and San Juan 
County have affirmatively recognized and approved county 
maps prepared by the State Road Commission for purposes 
of allocation of Class "B" and "C" road funds, which maps 
dearly show the position of Parallel 38° 30' North Latitude 
is about two-thirds of a mile north of all of the south lines 
of Township 26 South except at Ranges 25 and 26 East, where 
the lines are offset to the north. See Exhibits 45, 46 and 47. 
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These maps showing the position of the parallel were made 
from surveys, and from the known latitude and longitude of 
various Coast and Geodetic triangulation · stations in Grand 
and San Juan Counties (Tr. 281-296). These triangulation 
stations were established between 1893 and 1938. See Exhibit 
78. One second of latitude is 101.167 feet (Tr. 506). It is 
a matter of computation from the known latitude of the various 
Coast and Geodetic stations to determine the position of 38 ° 30'. 
Exhibit 104 is a resolution of Grand County Commissioners 
dated May 4, 1959, approving the road map prepared by the 
State Road Commission for allocation of Class "B" and "C" 
road funds. See also resolution dated September 12, 1960, 
Exhibit 115. Exhibit 110 shows the allocations of said Class 
"B" and "C" road funds since 1940, based upon the mileage 
established by said maps. These maps clearly show that the 
entire "disputed area" between 38° 30' North Latitude on the 
north and the south lines of Township 26 South on the south 
to be entirely in San Juan County. 
From 1952 to 1960 Grand County maintained certain 
portions of the roads in San Juan County and charged San 
Juan County for those maintenance costs. The county maps 
used for allocating the Class "B" and "C" road funds were 
used to compute the mileage of roads maintained by Grand 
County for San Juan County. The roads in the "disputed area" 
were included in the road mileage maintained by Grand County 
which were charged to San Juan County. Exhibit 114 is a copy 
of the agreement between the two counties dated 1955 for 
maintenance of certain San Juan County roads by Grand County. 
Exhibit 20 consists of photo copies of statements submitted 
by Grand County to San Juan County for such road maintenance 
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and warrants issued by San Juan County in payment of those 
charges, from 1952 to 1959 amounting to thousands of dollars. 
See also Exhibits 112, 116 and 117. After having charged San 
Juan County for many years for maintaining the roads in the 
"disputed area", the claim of "acquiescence" in the south line 
of Township 26 South as the "boundary" not only fails, but 
Grand County is estopped to deny that 38 ° 30' North Latitude 
is the actual boundary line. 
On March 12, 1958, Grand County requested the State 
Engineer to establish the boundary line and unequivocally 
declared that the boundary line is 38 o 30' North Latitude. 
(Exhibit 49.) Grand County was well aware of the maps 
showing the position of the county boundary to the north of 
the south lines of the townships, for Grand County mentioned 
those maps in its letter to the State Engineer. Furthermore, 
for twenty years Grand County had transacted business on 
the basis of those maps showing Parallel 38 ° 30' North 
Latitude to be approximately two-thirds of a mile north of 
all except two of the south lines of Township 26 South. Grand 
County made no pretense of "acquiescence" in the south lines 
of the townships in March, 1958. When the County Commis-
sioners met with the State Engineer, Grand County made no 
contention that the south lines of Township 26 South had been 
established as the boundary, but agreed to accept the deter-
mination by the State Engineer. In the letter dated April, 
1958, Exhibit 56, no claim of acquiescence was even hinted. 
The question was, Where is 38 o 30' North Latitude located? 
On May 6, 1958, Grand County stated by letter to the 
State Engineer that "it hoped that the line can be established 
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somewhere in relation to the south boundary line of Township 
26 South," and "once the actual location of latitude 38° 30' 
is established on the earth's surface . . . there will be no need 
to set markers along the boundary line, except in three or four 
predetermined places." Grand County made no claim then that 
there was any variance from true 38 o 30', nor that the boundary 
had been established on the south lines of the township by 
.. acquiescence." 
This action was filed December 28, 1958. The original 
answer and counterclaim of Grand County was filed February 
5, 1959, setting up the claim of acquiescence in the south lines 
of the townships as the boundary line. San Juan County sub-
mitted interrogatories. On September 18, 1959, Grand County, 
by H. B. Evans, County Commissioner, signing under oath, and 
Harry E. Snow, Esq., County Attorney, signing as counsel, 
answered inter alia: 
"Q. State in detail all of the facts which defendant will 
offer in evidence at the trial and all facts upon 
which defendant bases its allegation 'that the 
plaintiff and defendant mutually agreed as to its 
(boundary) location and for 68 years last past 
both the plaintiff and defendant have agreed and 
recognized that the true boundary between said 
counties coincides with the south boundary of 
Township 26 South ... ' " 
Answer by Grand County: "As of this date, it is im-
possible for the defendant to state and set forth 
in detail all of the facts the defendant will offer 
in evidence at the trial, if any." (Italics added). 
In Paragraph 9 of its counterclaim, defendant Grand 
County stated that for 68 years the boundary had been con-
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sidered by plaintiff and defendant counties as coincident with 
the south boundary line of Township 26 South, and in its 
interrogatories plaintiff asked the defendant to state in detail 
what evidence and facts it would produce at the trial to support 
such allegation. Grand County answered: 
"It is impossible for the defendant to state and set 
forth in detail what evidence and facts defendant will 
produce at the trial of this case in support of che 
allegation of said Paragraph 9." 
By Interrogatory 8 plaintiff asked: "Specifically, what facts 
defendant will rely on at the trial, if any, to show how and when 
said disputed area became a part of Grand County?" Grand 
County answered: 
"As of this date it is impossible for the defendant 
to state and set forth upon what facts defendant will 
rely at the trial, if any, to show how and when the 
said disputed area became a part of Grand County." 
(Italics added). 
Interrogatories 9 and 10 requested Grand County to state 
what facts it would introduce to show that the statute defining 
the San Juan County boundary never became operative' and 
by what statutes the territory was placed in Grand County. 
Both questions were answered by Grand County that "it is 
impossible for defendant to set forth such statutes" (R. 27-31). 
It is inconceivable that a party claiming long acquiescence 
could not name any facts or evidence to support that claim. 
The foregoing certainly discloses a hidden mental theory on 
the part of an undisclosed person and not the open, public 
recognition required to establish acquiescence. 
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Most of the argument in the Brief of Appellant is devoted 
to the contention that by agreement of the two counties the 
line was surveyed and monumented, and that such line was 
coincident with the south lines of Township 26 South. The 
only witness presented was C. R. Christensen, who testified 
to a 1912 survey. At the opening of trial it was admitted by 
Grand County that it had no plat of any survey (Tr. 16). No 
mention of any 1912 survey was made until February 8, 1961 
(Tr. 445). There are no field notes and no plat of such 
"survey" to show where the line was supposedly run with 
respect to any objects or monuments, and it would be utterly 
impossible to retrace the line. Counsel for Grand County 
admitted defendant had no evidence to tie with the 1912 line 
to any parallel of latitude (Tr. 447). Mr. Christensen's testi-
mony states that the line run in 1912 did not follow any town-
ship line, and that the line was to the north of the section 
corners. His testimony also refuted the argument that the south 
lines of township were established as the boundary line. 
Grand County tried to overcome the evidence which clearly 
showed that for over twenty years it had recognized Parallel 
38 o 30' North Latitude as the boundary line, by a number of 
incompetent or irrelevant documents. It showed that a few 
people who received patents to land in the "disputed area" 
recorded the patents in Grand County instead of San Juan 
County, and that by reason of such errors Grand County 
assessed those few tracts for taxes and collected taxes. The tax 
collections constituted only a small fraction of the total taxes 
collected on properties in the disputed area, the great bulk of 
which were collected by San Juan County because they were 
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levied on public utilities and the State Tax Commission used 
38 o 30' North Latitude as the county line as required by statute. 
Counsel for Grand County argued that the State Land 
-Board "recognized" the south line of Township 26 South as 
the boundary by issuing patents to lands in the disputed area, 
stating that the lands were in Grand County. Exhibits 167 and 
168 consist of over 700 pages of documents recorded in San 
Juan County covering lands in the "disputed area", including 
mining locations, oil and gas leases, and other instruments. 
Included in Exhibit 168 is a State potash lease dated December 
21, 1956, ML-15092, which states that the lands are in San 
Juan County. There are oil and gas leases covering lands in 
Grand County which are recorded in San Juan County. The 
State Land Board and others made a number of mistakes in 
stating the county in which certain lands were located. Those 
errors could not change the boundary line. If they could, then 
it could be argued that the county boundary line is over a mile 
north of 38 ° 30' North Latitude by reason of such errors in 
recordation. 
Grand County contends that a township plat from the 
United States public land surveys, showing the southeast corner 
is 38 ° 30' North Latitude, establishes the location of the 
parallel. If that be so, then Exhibit 4 shows that the southeast 
corner of Township~ South, Range 24 East is 38° 29' North 
Latitude (or 1.15 miles farther south, one minute of latitude 
being 6105.6 feet. R. 506). Legally, defendant's contention is 
not valid, but further, it is in error factually. 
Exhibits 9 and 10, excerpts from the Manual of Survey 
Instructions, Bureau of Land Management, show that to and 
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including the year 1930 the land surveyors were not required to 
compute latitude closer than one minute (which amounts to 
6105.6 feet or 1.15 miles). Later, the surveyors were required 
to tie their land surveys to the Coast and Geodetic triangulation 
stations and to use latitude and longitude as computed by the 
Coast and Geodetic Survey. Grand County did not show that 
any one in either county prior to 1958 ever looked at any of 
the old Land Office plats. 
Grand County introduced several "old maps" of Utah on 
which the county line was shown to be in the area of the south 
lines of Township 26 South, Ranges 25 and 26 East. Exhibits 
24, 25, 26, 27 and 28. Those maps were clearly erroneous. 
Exhibit 96, dated 1881, clearly shows the parallel to be about 
two-thirds of a mile north of the south lines of those two 
townships. There is no evidence that anyone ever saw or 
heard of those maps in either county prior to 1958. 
Grand County makes the novel argument that five "old 
maps" of Utah constitute proof that when the Legislature 
created Grand County in 1890 and used Parallel 38 ° 30' North 
Latitude as the county boundary it "intended" the south lines 
of Township 26 South. Two of the maps are dated 1884 and 
1889. By 1890 only the townships in Ranges 25 and 26 had 
been surveyed, or a total of 8Vz miles east and west. Over 45 
miles of township lines were unsurveyed, some of which were 
not surveyed until 1954. It is admitted that all maps and plats 
since 1925 prepared by the Bureau of Land Management and 
the State Road Commission show 38 ° 30' North Latitude to be 
about two-thirds of a mile north of the south lines of the 
townships except at Ranges 2 5 and 26 East. 
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Defendant attempts to change the plain wording of the 
statute by some extrinsic evidence to show that the Legislature 
in 1890 meant something other than what it plainly stated. 
Grand County ignored the fact that by revisions of the statutes 
in 1898 and 1933 the Legislature readopted 38° 30' North 
Latitude as the boundary line, not some township line or lines. 
This Court has announced the rule that legislative intent must 
be taken from the words of the statute itself. 
In Parkinson v. State Bank of Millard County, 84 Utah 
278, 35 P. (2d) 814, at Page 821, this Court says: 
" * * * Ordinarily the Legislature speaks only in 
general terms. Its intention and meaning primarily 
must be determined from language of the statute which 
should be given a liberal interpretation. Words and 
phrases are presumed to have been used according to 
their plain, natural, and common import and usage 
of the language, unless obviously used in a technical 
sense. Such is the effect of our statute, Rev. St. 1933, 
Sec. 88-2-11." 
In Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Board of Review, 118 Utah 
619, 223 P. (2d) 586, at Page 590, the Court states: 
"The primary purpose in construing statutes is to 
arrive at the legislative intent within the framework 
of the language used. * * * there is nothing indefinite 
or uncertain about the words, rrlf an employer has 
acquired all or substantially all the assets of another 
employer and such employer had discontinued opera-
tions upon such acquisition, the period of liability of 
both employers during such period shall be jointly con-
sidered for all purposes of this section.' We need not 
restrict the meaning of this phrase by assuming a narrow 
and rigid construction of the words. We accept them 
in their every day usage . . " 
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The statute which created San Juan County in 1880 used 
Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude four years before any of the 
"old maps" referred to by Grand County ever came into exist-
ence. In 1890 the Legislature again used that same parallel. 
That parallel is a definite ascertainable boundary line. There 
can be no resort to extrinsic evidence to speculate that the 
Legislature might have meant something it did not say. In the 
revisions of the statutes in 1898 and 1933 the original boundary 
line was reenacted. 
Grand County has maintained an airport which is ad-
mittedly located in both Grand . and San Juan Counties. It 
is in both Grand and San Juan Counties, for it is in Townships 
26 and 27 South. Because San Juan County quitclaimed to 
Grand County the lands in Township 27 South, it is argued 
in Appellant's Brief that San Juan County impliedly recognized 
the south line of Township 26 South as the county boundary. 
There can be no such implication. The deed clearly states that 
the land is in San Juan County, and no county boundary is 
mentioned. Exhibit 158 is a patent from the State of Utah 
covering lands in the disputed area and to the north thereof, 
in Section 36, which patent states that the lands are in San 
Juan and Grand Counties. 
Grand County cites Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 
37 L. Ed. 537, 13 S. Ct. 728. That case is not in point for the 
boundary line actually had been marked and established in 
1803 and there was a compact between the two states approving 
that line. 
Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479, 34 L. Ed. 329, 10 S. 
Ct. 1051, involved an uncertain boundary. The statute admitting 
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Kentucky into the Union made the north side of the Ohio 
River the state boundary. The river meanders and the courses 
had changed. There was some uncertainty as to whether an 
island in the river was actually within the river when Kentucky 
became a state. 
New Mexico v. Colorado, 267 U. S. 30, 69 L. Ed. 499, 
45 S. Ct. 202, cited on Page 24 of Appellant's Brief by the 
wrong citation, does not support the contentions of Grand 
County. The dispute arose over a U. S. Land Office survey 
in conflict with a prior boundary survey. The Supreme Court 
held that U. S. Land Office surveys cannot alter boundary lines 
established by law. 
(D) IT IS A CARDINAL RULE OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE THAT A JUDGMENT RIGHT IN RE-
SULT WILL NOT BE REVERSED MEREY BECAUSE 
THE WRONG REASONS WERE STATED FOR EN-
TRY OF SUCH A JUDGMENT. 
Regardless of the erroneous reason stated for dismissal of 
the counterclaim, that the trial court was "without jurisdiction," 
the result was right and Grand County is not entitled to a 
reversal of the judgment of dismissal of such counterclaim. 
In Dayton Power & Light Co. v .Public Utilities Com., 292 
U. S. 290, 78 L. Ed. 1267, 54 S. Ct. 647, the United States 
Supreme Court said, "The appellant may not prevail unless 
there has been error in the result as well as error in the reason-
ing." See also Rose Hill Cemetery Co. v. Chicago, 352 Ill. 11, 
185 N. E. 170, 87 A.L.R. 742, and 3 Am. Jur., P. 37, Sec. 
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825. "A decision right in result will not be reversed even 
though the reason stated for it is wrong." 3 Am. Jur., P. 563. 
The judgment dismissing the counterclaim was right be-
cause of a clear lack of any competent evidence, and for the 
further reason that the. counterclaim was contrary to law, since 
the county boundary line was fixed by statute and said line 
is a definite ascertainable boundary line, and could not be shifted 
by "acquiescence" to some jagged line never authorized nor 
described by statute. 
POINT 2. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING 
THAT IT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO DETER-
1'IINE THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE CASE, AND IN 
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFF. 
San Juan County concurs with the contention of Grand 
County that the District Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the controversy between the two counties. San Juan County 
takes the position that the counterclaim of Grand County was 
properly dismissed, although for the wrong reason. San Juan 
County takes the position that it was error to dismiss the com-
plaint in its entirety, and that the District Court should have 
granted judgment in favor of plaintiff in accordance with Find-
ing of Fact No. 3. 
By Finding of Fact No.3 the Court found that the common 
boundary line between Grand and San Juan Counties has been 
established by the Territorial and State Legislatures and has 
11never varied and has always been described as Parallel 38° 30; 
North Latitude." 
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The jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked by the 
complaint of San Juan County to determine what is the common 
boundary between the two counties "that is now established 
by law." The complaint does not seek to have the court deter-
mine where the boundary is precisely located on the ground, 
but what is the lawfully established boundary. The issue as to 
what is the boundary established by law arises from the recent 
contention made by Grand County to the effect that the bound-
ary is not Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude as defined in the 
statutes, but the south lines of Townships 26 South. It was 
alleged that Grand County sought to exercise jurisdiction over 
a strip of land between Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude on the 
north and the south lines of Townships 26 South on the south, 
called "the disputed area." 
By answer Grand County admitted that it was claiming 
jurisdiction over the strip of land called "the disputed area," 
and that it asserted a right to collect taxes on property lying 
in the disputed area. Grand County alleged by its answer and 
counterclaim that the boundary is not Parallel 38 o 30' North 
Latitude, but a line coincident with the south lines of Town-
ships 26 South. Thus even the answer and counterclaim show 
there is a controversy as to what is the lawfully existing bound-
ary line. 
Article VIII, Seeton 7, Constitution of Utah, provides that 
the District Courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal not excepted by the Constitution and not 
prohibited by law. Article I, Section 11, provides that "all 
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to 
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy 
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by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay." 
Our code specifically authorizes action by one county 
against another county, Section 78-13-3, U.C.A. 1953: 
"An action against a county may be commenced and 
tried in such county, unless such action is brought by a 
county, in which case it may be commenced and tried 
in any county not a party thereto." 
Whether or not the State Engineer finished the job of 
surveying and monumenting the boundary line was not a fact 
which could divest the trial court of jurisdiction, when Grand 
County expressly admitted it was trying to exercise county 
jurisdiction south of Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude, and that 
Grand County would continue to do so until otherwise ordered 
by the court. It was error for the trial court to dismiss the 
complaint and refuse to give plaintiff judgment defining the 
boundary as Parallel 38 o 30' North Latitude. 
POINT 3. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
ENTER JUDGMENT THAT THE BOUNDARY LINE 
BETWEEN SAN JUAN ANTI GRAND COUNTIES WAS 
AND IS 38° 30' NORTH LATITUDE AND THAT SUCH 
BOUNDARY LINE NEVER HAS BEEN LAWFULLY 
CHANGED. 
The District Court appropriately made Findings of Fact 
1, 2, 3 and 4 from the statutes and the admissions of Grand 
County and the competent evidence. Having correctly found 
that the common boundary "has never varried and has always 
44 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been described as Parallel 38° 30' North Latitude," San Juan 
County was and is entitled to have judgment rendered in ac-
cordance with those findings, inasmuch as Grand County 
attempted to move the line from a half mile to two-thirds of 
a mile southward to the south lines of Townships 26 South. 
On page 42 of its brief, Grand County states under its 
Point III: 
"The Court should have determined as a matter of 
law that 38 o 30' North Latitude, as historically marked 
and monumented, is the common boundary line be-
tween the two counties and was what the Legislature 
creating the counties intended as the true common 
boundary between the counties." 
San Juan County agrees with all of the quoted statement 
except "as historically marked and monumented," for prior 
to 1958 the parallel was not marked and monumented. On 
page 31 Grand County states that ''The exact position of 38° 30' 
North Latitude is still unmarked on the earth's surface," which 
indicates that the parallel has never been marked and monu-
mented. Judgment should be entered adjudging that the com-
mon boundary was and is 38° 30' North Latitude and that 
said boundary line has never been changed to the south lines 
of Townships 26 South nor to some other line. 
Even if San Juan County were properly found not to be 
entitled to all of the judicial relief it sought in bringing the 
action, that would not warrant denial of all judicial relief. The 
trial court should have entered judgment establishing the 
statutory line of 38 ° 30' North Latitude and judgment that 
such boundary line never has been legally changed, in order 
"to determine the ultimate rights of the parties" as provided 
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in Rule 54 (c) . Our Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate 
that a party to an action shall be granted the relief to which 
he is entitled. 
POINT 4. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
COSTS TO DEFENDANT. 
Inasmuch as the District Court properly dismissed the 
counterclaim of Grand County, and inasmuch as San Juan 
County was entitled to at least some judicial relief, it was error 
to assess costs against San Juan County. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of dismissal of the counterclaim of Grand 
County should be affirmed, inasmuch as Grand County at-
tempted to annex about 3 5 square milse of San Juan County 
without compliance with the constitutional requirements. The 
judgment dismissing the complaint should be reversed and 
judgment should be entered that 38 ° 30' North Latitude was 
and is the county boundary line and that said boundary line 
has never been lawfully changed to the south lines of Townships 
26 South, nor to any other position at variance with the true 
statutory line. San Juan County should recover its costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. BENNION REDD 
San Juan County Attorney 
McKAY AND BURTON 
By WILFORD M. BURTON and 
PAUL E. REIMANN 
Attorneys for San Juan County, 
Plaintiff and Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant 
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